La filosofa de la liberacin latinoamericana es expresin de la realidad social e histrica de Latinoamrica. Los contrastes y la desigualdad se expresan en su discurso, tanto como en el historicismo, la sociologa y la teologa latinoamericanas.

Este ensayo -que plantea algunas sugerencias quizás fecundas para la discusión- constituye un examen crítico de algunos aspectos significativos de la tesis intercultural de la obra de Raúl Fornet Betancourt. En este sentido, se ha organizado la exposición en tres apartados de desigual extensión: trayectoria, autocritica y reparos. El análisis de la obra de este autor permite concluir, en primer lugar, que su propuesta intercultural ha sido planteada por otros autores, lo que le resta originalidad; en segundo lugar, a pesar (...) de ser un una propuesta metodológica para el estudio del pensamiento latinoamericano, su reflexión no logra rebasar los límites del pensamiento eurocéntrico; y, finalmente, reducir las críticas y los reparos a una interculturalidad lastrada por la inculturación, es sólo una salida fácil e insuficiente. (shrink)

El presente trabajo constituye un homenaje al filósofo mendocino Arturo Andrés Roig. En el mismo se recuperan algunas de las observaciones de Roig respecto del humanismo utópico y mesiánico con sus numerosas variantes y matices, mediante la utilización del recurso al "discurso referido". Se atiende especialmente al caso del jesuita chileno Manuel Lacunza (1731-1801). This work is a tribute to the philosopher, Arturo Andrés Roig, born in Mendoza, Argentina. In that one there are recovered some of Roig's observations regarding messianic (...) and utopian humanism with their numerous variants and nuances, by means of the use of the resource to the "referred speech". Special attention is paid to the case of the Chilean Jesuit Manuel Lacunza (1731-1801). (shrink)

This paper constitutes a proposition for autonomous integration that propitiates regional negotiation in the face of the ALCA. To do this, it proposes to recuperate one´s own in genuity, which supposes surpassing the obstacle constructed by transitology, be yond abandonment of the structural hi..

En este texto se hace una brevísima reflexión en torno al quehacer filosófico como labor temporal ceñida al presente, el filosofar en su estructura fundamental ha de ser cuestionado desde lo local en razón a su temporalidad actual. Lo presentado es más que una apuesta, un alto en el camino para examinar las fuentes de la eventualidad y sus estructuras fundamentales.

La aportación filosófica de Arturo Andrés Roig abrevó de múltiples fuentes; en este artículo se ahonda en los antecedentes del concepto acuñado por Roig: “giro lingüístico”. Según el autor de este artículo, en la construcción de éste término confluyen tres ejes: el lingüístico (Bachtin/Volochinov), ..

En este texto se intenta una síntesis de investigaciones efectuadas a lo largo de varias décadas, procurando abordar las múltiples facetas de la utopía, siempre con un énfasis epistémico y abrevando en múltiples campos disciplinarios, al tiempo que jugando con diversos niveles de lenguaje.

This book brings the history of Latin American philosophy to an English-speaking audience through the prominent voices of Mauricio Beuchot, Horacio Cerutti-Guldberg, María Luisa Femenías, Jorge J. E. Gracia, Oscar R. Martí, León Olivé, Carlos Pereda, and Eduardo Rabossi. They argue that Spanish is not a philosophically irrelevant language and that there are original positions to be found in the work of Latin American philosophers.

Contiene tres trabajos sobre Arturo Ardao: sobre la noción de sujeto (Yamandú Acosta); sobre la interpretación de Andrés Bello (Arturo A. Roig); y sobre su libro Filosofía de lengua española (ver HLAS 36:5047). Mencionamos algunas de las otras contribuciones: el tema de la historia de la filosofía latinoamericana (Horacio Cerutti Guldberg); el batllismo (Manuel A. Claps); el tema de Calibán (Roberto Fernández Retamar); el pensamiento de Pedro Figari (Juan Fló); la universidad latinoamericana en el siglo XVIII (Gregorio Weinberg); (...) el pensamiento socialista en el Uruguay (Carlos Zubillaga). Es de lamentar que no se agregara al volumen una bibliografía de Ardao"--Handbook of Latin American Studies, v. 58. (shrink)

Argues that there are original positions to be found in the work of Latin American philosophers. This book brings the history of Latin American philosophy to an English-speaking audience through the prominent voices of Mauricio Beuchot, Horacio Cerutti-Guldberg, María Luisa Femenías, Jorge J. E. Gracia, Oscar R. Martí, León Olivé, Carlos Pereda, and Eduardo Rabossi. They argue that Spanish is not a philosophically irrelevant language and that there are original positions to be found in the work of Latin (...) American philosophers. Part I of the book looks at why the history of philosophy has not developed in Latin America. A range of theoretical issues are explored, each focusing on specific problems that have hindered the development of a solid history. Part II details the complex task of writing a history of philosophy for a region still haunted by the specter of colonialism. Arleen Salles is Assistant Professor in the Department of Art, Music, and Philosophy at John Jay College of Criminal Justice, The City University of New York. Elizabeth Millán-Zaibert is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at DePaul University and the coeditor (with Jorge J. E. Gracia) of Latin American Philosophy for the 21st Century: The Human Condition, Values, and the Search for Identity. (shrink)

Resumen:Este artículo presenta una lectura crítica de la filosofía de Enrique Dussel, donde se consideran los quiebres y continuidades de su proyecto ético temprano y maduro. El objetivo de la investigación es explorar y exponer el pensamiento del autor en relación con las problemáticas, críticas y polémicas que presenta. Para esto se esclarecen las posiciones éticas y políticas tempranas de su filosofía, la atingencia de la crítica de Horacio Cerutti, la estructura de la ética madura, el debate con (...) Karl-Otto Apel, la estructura de la política de la liberación y la crítica de Santiago Castro-Gómez. El texto presenta una lectura secular y crítica de una de las filosofías de la liberación más relevantes en Latinoamérica.Palabras clave: Enrique Dussel; filosofía de la liberación; filosofía latinoamericana; modernidad/decolonialidad; Santiago Castro-Gómez. (shrink)

El término nuestroamericano —utilizado por Horacio Cerutti— tiene sus fundamentos en el concepto "Nuestra América". Este hilo conductor de pensamiento tiene como hecho ineludible el hacerse cargo de la realidad en que se vive y del lugar en donde se está, hecho expresado en un permanente interés en la identidad cultural y nacional, como también por una lectura crítica y explicativa del desarrollo de las ideas. En el caso de Chile, a nuestro juicio, la memoria filosófica nuestroamericana ha (...) tendido a ser borrada, olvidada, siendo obnubilada por un fuerte eurocentrismo, lo que ha dado como resultado un escaso número de filósofos preocupados por "lo latinoamericano". Así, este trabajo indaga sobre los orígenes de la vertiente latinoamericanista en la filosofía chilena en la segunda mitad del siglo XX. A modo de conclusión, proponemos que no es sino hasta los años ochenta cuando, desde el Círculo de Filosofía de la Academia de Humanismo Cristiano, se genera un punto de inflexión con la tradición filosófica chilena, dando origen de forma más nítida a la vertiente nuestroamericana que, antes de esto, solo habría tenido pequeñas huellas dispersas. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to defend a novel characterization of epistemic luck. Helping myself to the notions of epistemic entitlement and adequate explanation, I propose that a true belief suffers from epistemic luck iff an adequate explanation of the fact that the belief acquired is true must appeal to propositions to which the subject herself is not epistemically entitled. The burden of the argument is to show that there is a plausible construal of the notions of epistemic entitlement (...) and adequate explanation on which the resulting characterization of epistemic luck, though admittedly programmatic, has several important virtues. It avoids difficulties which plague modal accounts of epistemic luck; it can explain the conflicting temptations one can feel in certain alleged cases of epistemic luck; it offers a novel account of the value of knowledge, without committing itself to any particular analysis of knowledge; and it illuminates the significance for epistemology of the phenomenon of epistemic luck itself. (shrink)

The process of education, and in particular that involving very young children, often involves students' taking their teachers' word on a good many things. At the same time, good education at every level ought to inculcate, develop, and support students' ability to think for themselves. While these two features of education need not be regarded as contradictory, it is not clear how they relate to one another, nor is it clear how (when taken together) these features ought to bear on (...) educational practice itself. This article, which is largely programmatic, aims to provide tentative answers to these questions. (shrink)

Among epistemologists, it is common to assume that insofar as coherence bears on the justification of belief, the only relevant coherence relations are those _within_ an individual subject’s web of beliefs. After clarifying this view and exploring some plausible motivations for it, we argue that this individualistic account of the epistemic relevance of coherence fails to account for central facets of scientific practice. In its place we propose a social account of coherence. According to the view we propose, a scientist (...) _S_’s belief that _p_ is _prima facie_ unjustified if this belief negatively coheres with justified scientific claims in her scientific community. This account of coherence yields an epistemology for scientific belief which, we argue, has all of the benefits and none of the liabilities of its more individualistic predecessor. (shrink)

Reason is precariously positioned in the Critique of Pure Reason. The Transcendental Analytic leaves no entry for reason in the cognitive process, and the Transcendental Dialectic restricts reason to noncognitive roles. Yet, in the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic, Kant contends that the ideas of reason can be used in empirical investigation and eventually knowledge acquisition. Given what Kant has said, how is this possible? Kant attempts to answer this in A663–A666/B691–B694 in the Appendix, where he argues that principles of (...) reason “have objective but indeterminate validity.” In Part I of this paper, I explain the full motivation behind this section. In Part II, I provide an exegesis of it. In particular, to reach his conclusion that principles of reason have objective but indeterminate validity, I interpret Kant as making three arguments from analogy. Finally, in Part III, I show that the first and third arguments fail—and what this means for Kant’s project. (shrink)

Happy accidents happen even in philosophy. Sometimes our arguments yield insights despite missing their target, though when they do others can often spot it more easily. Consider the work of Donald Davidson. Few did more to explore connections among mind, language, and world. Now that we have critical distance from his views, however, we can see that Davidson’s accomplishments are not quite what they seem. First, while Davidson attacked the dualism of conceptual scheme and empirical content, he in fact illustrated (...) a way to hold it. Second, while Davidson used the principle of charity to argue against the dualism, his argument in effect treats the principle as constitutive of a conceptual scheme. And third, while Davidson asserted that he cannot define what truth ultimately is—and while I do not disagree—his work nonetheless allows us to saymore about truth than Davidson himself does. -/- I aim to establish these three claims. Doing so enriches our understanding of issues central to the history of philosophy concerning how, if at all, to divvy up the mental or linguistic contribution, and the worldly contribution, to knowledge. As we see below, Davidson was right in taking his work to be one stage of a dialectic begun by Immanuel Kant.1 He was just wrong about what that stage is. Reconsidering Davidson’s views also moves the current debate forward, as they reveal a previously unrecognized yet intuitive notion of truth—even if Davidson himself remained largely unaware of it. We begin however with scheme/content dualism and Davidson’s argument against it. (shrink)

A rational moral code must satisfy the condition of completeness. This same condition applies to a set of moral rights, where it takes the form of requiring that all the rights in that set be compossible: that their respective correlatively entailed duties be jointly fulfillable. Such joint fulfillability is guaranteed only by a set of fully differentiated individual domains. And if moral rights are to play any independent role in moral reasoning - any role logically independent of the values that (...) bring persons into conflict - those domains must be determined by rules which are not derived from those values. (shrink)